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1 Introduction
It is widely recognized that public expenditure on infrastructure such as roads, ports, or
communication systems, public research spending and the provision of basic education and
medical services raises the economic potential of an economy. At least since the inuential
study of Aschauer (1989) and the following discussion (see, de Haan and Romp (2007) for a
recent survey of this empirical literature) it is argued that a rise in productive government
activity increases output. Easterly and Rebelo (1993) and, more recently, Canning and
Pedroni (2004) nd evidence for long-run growth eects associated with public investment
in infrastructure. In addition, many case studies highlight the growth-enhancing potential
associated with such investments (see, e.g., OECD (2007)).
The purpose of this paper is to provide a critical survey on the recent theoretical literature
that aims at the identication of possible links between productive government activity
and long-run economic growth and the assessment of the resulting allocation in terms
of welfare. To accomplish this, we have to focus on endogenous growth models where
variations in scal policy parameters may have an eect on long-run growth.1 To the best
of our knowledge, Barro (1990) is the seminal paper in this eld. It introduces government
expenditure as a public good into the production function of individual rms. In this way
the rate of return to private capital increases which stimulates private investment and
growth.
We show that the ensuing literature is able to extend Barro's analysis to incorporate
many relevant aspects that interact with the eect of public services on economic growth.
They include adjustment costs, congestion eects, utility-enhancing public consumption
services, endogenous labor supply both in closed and small open economies. We establish
that the mechanics and the core results for each aspect can be gained from the study of the
respective Euler equation. We use this approach to characterize the determinants of the
equilibrium growth rate and to analyze the role of scal policy measures on this growth
rate. Moreover, we conduct a welfare analysis and derive the circumstances under which
the welfare-maximizing allocation can be implemented.2
While Barro (1990) treated productive government expenditure as a ow variable, the
paper by Futagami, Morita, and Shibata (1993) introduces the provision of productive
1For the study of various aspects of public expenditure in the neoclassical growth model, the interested
reader is referred to Arrow and Kurz (1970), Aschauer (1988), Barro (1989), Baxter and King (1993),
Fisher and Turnovsky (1995), or Fisher and Turnovsky (1998).
2Throughout we stick to a continuous-time framework with innitely-lived dynasties. Moreover, we do
not explicitly consider education and human capital formation as a government activity. This is at the
heart of, e.g., Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) or, more recently, G omez (2007). See Zagler and D urnecker
(2003) for a survey of this literature.Productive Government Expenditure and Economic Growth { A Survey 2
government services as a stock. At rst sight, this approach is more appealing since
services like public infrastructure are more realistically described as stocks. However, the
advantage in terms of realism has a price in terms of analytical complexity. For instance,
this approach usually entails complex transitional dynamics and the steady-state growth
rate is no longer determined by the Euler equation alone. Nevertheless, we argue that
the analysis of the balanced growth path in the stock case conrms most results that are
obtained in the ow case. An important dierence occurs in the welfare analysis. The
fact that current public investments become only productive tomorrow tends to reduce
the welfare-maximizing share of government investment. We show that these ndings are
robust in a setting where a ow and a stock of public services are provided simultaneously.
However, the stock approach allows to address new questions that cannot be raised in a
ow context. We make this point with an analysis that introduces an additional productive
use of government expenditure, namely the maintenance of the public capital stock.
Finally, we turn to more fundamental variations of the analytical framework and ask for the
robustness of the policy implications derived so far. For a stochastic setting we conclude
that the policy implications are similar in spite of the fact that precautionary savings drive
a wedge between the goals of growth and welfare maximization. In contrast, we argue that
the knife-edge assumption of constant returns to scale with respect to private and public
capital is responsible for many ndings. For instance, under increasing returns multiple
equilibria are endemic. This complicates the policy implications since the eect of scal
policy measures is now conditional on expectations. Similarly, if productive government
services are provided in a non-scale model, they cease to have an eect on the steady-state
growth rate.
In light of these ndings, we conclude that future research ought to focus on a deeper
understanding of the policy implications that matter in reality. Certainly, a focus on
the analysis of productive government services on economic growth in idea-based endoge-
nous growth models is likely to enhance our understanding of the relationship between
productive government expenditure and economic growth.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the basic analytical
framework. In Section 3 we deal with the ow model and variants of this approach.
Section 4 presents variants of the stock approach and compares them to the respective
ow cases. Important extensions such as uncertainty, increasing returns and non-scale
models are covered in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. The Appendix derives somewhat
more complicated results that appear in Section 4.1.Productive Government Expenditure and Economic Growth { A Survey 3
2 The Basic Analytical Framework
Consider a closed economy in continuous time with many identical and competitive house-
hold-producers and a government. We denote per-household magnitudes by small letters,
whereas capital letters represent aggregates. For instance, k(t) is the private capital input
of an individual rm at t, and K(t) the economy's aggregate capital stock at t. Henceforth,
we suppress the time argument whenever this does not cause confusion. We represent
household-producers by the interval [0;N], N > 1, such that K = Nk. The \number"
of household-producers remains constant over time. The economy has one good that can
be consumed or invested. At all t, prices are expressed in units of the contemporaneous
output of this good.
Each producer has access to the per-period production function
y = f(k;g) = Ak1 g; 0 <  < 1; (2.1)
where y denotes rm output at t, A > 0 the time-invariant total factor productivity, and g
the services derived by the rm from productive government activity at t. Private capital,
k, has a positive but diminishing marginal product, and for simplicity does not depreciate.3
The function f has constant returns to scale with respect to both inputs. The possibility
of steady-state growth arises since government activity acts as a countervailing force on
the diminishing marginal product of private capital. To keep the marginal and the average
productivity of private capital constant, in a steady state k and g have to grow at the
same rate. To simplify the exposition, we work with the Cobb-Douglas specication.
Household-producers are innitely-lived and derive utility in each period from private





where  > 0 is the instantaneous rate of time preference. For expositional convenience we
stick to a logarithmic per-period utility function. Most of the results presented in what
follows readily extend to more general per-period utility functions with a constant elasticity
of intertemporal substitution dierent from unity. Each household-producer receives net
3Labor is not mentioned as a separate input in the production function. This is a valid shortcut if
we interpret the prot of each rm as the wage income that is earned by labor. More precisely, we may
admit to each household-producer an exogenous per-period labor endowment  l = 1 that is inelastically
supplied and consider a production function y = Ak
1    lg
. Marginal cost pricing of labor and a real
wage consistent with rms hiring  l determines the wage income equal to the prot income of rms that
produce according to (2.1) without labor. This is an implication of Euler's law for linear-homogeneous
functions.Productive Government Expenditure and Economic Growth { A Survey 4
output and determines how much to consume and how much to invest in private capital.
Her ow budget constraint is
_ k = (1   y)f (k;g)   (1 + c)c   ; (2.3)
where y and c denote time-invariant tax rates on income/output and consumption, and
 is a lump-sum tax. When choosing c and k to maximize her utility the individual
household-producer takes the level of public services as given and disregards the possible
impact of her decision on the amount of public services provided. Then, her intertemporal
optimization leads to the Euler condition




i.e., the growth rate of consumption c depends on the dierence between the after-tax
private marginal return on private capital and the rate of time preference. Throughout,
we assume that the economy is suciently productive to sustain a strictly positive growth
rate c.
We denote G the aggregate amount of productive government activity at t from which
individual rms derive the services g. Conceptually, G may be a ow or a stock variable.
In the former case, government spending corresponds to the provision of public services
that instantaneously aect the production technology of rms. In the latter case, today's
government spending adds to the stock of public capital and aects the future produc-
tion technology of rms. In any case, the government claims resources from household-
producers and transforms them one-to-one into a productive input to which rms get
access. We assume that the government's budget is balanced in all periods. Let Y and
C denote aggregate output and consumption at t and dene total tax receipts at t by
T  yY + cC + N. Then, the budget constraint at t is
G = T or _ G = T (2.5)
for the ow and the stock case, respectively. Throughout, we focus on tax-nanced ex-
penditure and disregard funding via public debt.
3 Productive Government Activity as a Flow
Along a steady-state growth path with all variables growing at a constant rate, government
expenditure must be proportionate to the size of the economy. To comply with this
requirement, we stipulate for all t that
G = G Y; (3.1)Productive Government Expenditure and Economic Growth { A Survey 5
where G 2 (0;1) is a time-invariant constant measuring the fraction of current output that
constitutes the current ow of productive government expenditure. If G includes public
investment as well as government expenditure on public order and safety, on economic
aairs, and on health and education, one nds for a sample of 19 OECD countries that
the average G over the time period 1995 to 2002 ranges between 10% and 20%.4
3.1 The Pure Public Good Case
Following Barro (1990), we rst consider the case where government services are neither
rival nor excludable. In this case, G is a pure public good and g = G such that the
production function (2.1) becomes
y = AGk1 ; 0 <  < 1: (3.2)
One may of think of G as government expenditure on basic education, the provision of
medical services, or public research spending that increases the productivity of private
inputs of all rms in the same manner.
Decentralized Equilibrium
Following the reasoning that led to the Euler equation (2.4) we nd






The ratio of government spending per unit of private capital consistent with condition
(3.1), the aggregation Y = Ny, and the production function (3.2) is G=k = (ANG)
1=(1 ).
Upon substitution of the latter in (3.3) we obtain
c = (1   y)(1   )(AN
G)
1
1    : (3.4)
At this stage, three remarks are in order. First, there are admissible values for y, c, , and
G that satisfy the budget constraint (2.5). Hence, given c and , y and G that appear
in (3.4) are not independent. Second, one can show that the economy immediately jumps
onto its steady-state path along which all per-capita magnitudes grow at rate c. Third,
4This nding is based on our own computations. We use data collected in UNdata (2008). Public
investment corresponds to gross xed capital formation of general government. Government expenditure
on public order and safety, on economic aairs, and on health and education are subcategories of govern-
ment nal consumption expenditure. The sample includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. This selection of OECD countries maxi-
mizes the number of countries and the length of the time period for which a full set of comparable annual
data on the components of G mentioned above are available. The sample average of G across countries
and time is approximately 15%.Productive Government Expenditure and Economic Growth { A Survey 6
the equilibrium growth rate depends on the \number" of household-producers, i.e., there
is a scale eect. The latter occurs since individual rm productivity depends on aggregate
spending (G = GY ). Then, with more rms the externality is more pronounced.5
An interesting question is how the size of the government and the mode of funding govern-
ment spending aects the economy's steady-state growth rate. A useful benchmark has
c =  = 0 such that G = y. In this case, there is a growth-maximizing expenditure share
equal to the output elasticity of government expenditure, 
G = .6 Intuitively, it balances
two opposing eects. A rise in G increases the private marginal product of private capital
and reduces its after-tax value through a necessary increase in the distortionary income
tax. At 
G, government expenditure satises the so-called natural condition of productive
eciency, i.e., the marginal contribution of government expenditure to aggregate output
is one.7 The steady-state growth rate may be further increased if a strictly positive con-
sumption or lump-sum tax is levied. In the present context, a consumption tax acts like
a lump-sum tax and both may be used to reduce the distortionary income tax. However,
there is little reason why the steady-state growth rate should be arbitrarily large since
faster economic growth has a cost in terms of foregone consumption. To assess the desir-
ability of a given consumption growth rate we have to compare it to the allocation chosen
by an omniscient social planner.
Pareto Eciency
Contrary to the household-producer, the social planner knows that - given G - the choice
of k aects the level of government expenditure G through condition (3.1) and Y = Ny.





The aggregate resource constraint is N _ k = Ny   G   Nc. It results as the sum of
all individual ow budget constraints (2.3) in conjunction with the government's budget
5 To eliminate the scale eect one may assume that the government service is not excludable but rival
such that each producer receives a proportionate share of government services, i.e., g = G=N. In this case,




1    and is independent of N. We
shall get back to this case in Section 3.3 where we discuss dierent forms of congestion.
6For more general production functions f(k;g) with constant returns to scale in its inputs the growth-
maximizing expenditure share remains equal to the respective output elasticity. This elasticity, however,
need not be constant but may vary with G and other parameters. This generalization may prevent closed-
form solutions (see, e.g., Ott and Turnovsky (2006) for a discussion).
7To grasp the natural condition of productive eciency consider a coal mine that uses its coal as
an input. Then, what is the output-maximizing amount of the coal input? Intuitively, as long as an
additional unit of coal raises output by more than one unit it will be used; if its marginal product is
smaller, it will not. The quantity that maximizes output obtains when the marginal product of coal in
its production is one. In the present context, we have from equation (3.2) with Y = Ny = ANG
k
1 :
dY=dG = (Y=G) = =

G = 1.Productive Government Expenditure and Economic Growth { A Survey 7
constraint and (3.1). Expressed in per-household terms, this is
_ k = (1   G)y   c: (3.6)
Throughout, we shall refer to an allocation as constrained Pareto-ecient if the planner
takes the share of government expenditure G as a given constant. The unconstrained or,
in short, the Pareto-ecient allocation is the one obtained when the planner chooses G
optimally.
Here, the constrained Pareto-ecient allocation obtains from the maximization of u given
by (2.2) with respect to c and k subject to (3.6). The corresponding Euler condition
delivers the steady-state growth rate of all per-household magnitudes and is given by
P
c = (1   G)(AN
G)
1
1    : (3.7)
The rst term on the right-hand side is the social marginal return on private capital. It
does not coincide with the after-tax private marginal product that matters in (3.4). The
comparison of the equilibrium to the planner's growth rate reveals that
c = P
c , (1   y)(1   ) = 1   G: (3.8)
These growth rates generically dier for two reasons. First, in equilibrium intertemporal
prices are distorted due to the income tax. If the government sets y = 0 to eliminate
this distortion and nances its expenditure via lump-sum taxes these growth rates may
still dier as G need not be equal to . This reects the second dierence. The planner
internalizes the externality associated with the provision of the public good, i.e., when
choosing c and k he accounts for condition (3.1).
If we extend the planner's choice set and allow him to determine the size of the government
in addition to c and k, one nds that he chooses P
G = . The Pareto-ecient growth rate
is then given by P
c of (3.8) with G = . As a consequence, the equilibrium and the
Pareto-ecient allocation coincide if y = 0 and G is chosen optimally.
3.2 Productive Government Expenditure and Adjustment Costs
Often the productive use of new private capital requires adjustment costs. Examples
include costs for the installation of equipment or the schooling of employees. Adjustment
costs increase the eective costs of private investment and may therefore discourage the
accumulation of private capital. Here, we introduce this feature into the pure public good
framework of the previous section.
Following Turnovsky (1996a) we assume that productive government expenditure reduces
adjustment costs. For instance, due to a better road network the setup costs of a newProductive Government Expenditure and Economic Growth { A Survey 8
factory may be lower. We capture this feature with an adjustment cost function per unit of
investment given by (G)i=(2k), where i denotes investment per household-producer. A
higher share of government activity reduces adjustment costs, though at a declining rate,
i.e., 0 < 0 < 00. As in Hayashi (1982), we assume that adjustment costs are proportional
to the rate of investment per unit of installed capital and not to the absolute level of











Individual household-producers choose a plan (c;k;i) for each t to maximize u of (2.2)
subject to the constraints
i = _ k and (3.10)
(1   y)AGk1     = (1 + c)c + '(i;k;(G)); (3.11)
where the latter equalizes disposable income to consumption and investment outlays.
The resulting optimality condition with respect to i reveals that the current-value shadow
price of installed capital in units of current output is equal to the marginal investment
costs, i.e.,




Hence, for an investing rm (i > 0) the value of installed capital exceeds unity. With





The Euler equation is now given by
c =












The rst three terms on the right-hand side represent the rate of return on acquiring a
unit of private capital at price q. The rst term denotes the after-tax private marginal
return on private capital deated by the cost of capital q. The second term is the rate of
capital gain. The third term reects the marginal reduction in adjustment costs when k
increases for given i deated by q. In the absence of adjustment costs q = 1 for all t and
(3.14) reduces to (3.4).
In the steady state, per-household magnitudes such as c, k, and i grow at the same rate;
from (3.12) we also have _ q = 0. Using (3.12) and (3.13) in the Euler condition (3.14)




c + [1 + (G)]c = (1   y)(1   )(A
GN)
1
1    : (3.15)Productive Government Expenditure and Economic Growth { A Survey 9
Hence, the right-hand side of (3.15) coincides with the equilibrium growth rate of (3.4)
where adjustment costs are absent. However, since the left-hand side of (3.15) increases
faster than proportionately in c, the resulting steady-state growth rate must be smaller
with than without adjustment costs.
Turning to the eect of productive government expenditure on the steady-state growth








+ (1   G)
y
kG   (1   )
y
k
1 + (G)(c + )
: (3.16)
The latter highlights three channels through which government activity aects the growth
rate. First, the reduction in adjustment costs (0 < 0) increases the growth rate. The
second and the third channel matter in the same way as in the scenario without adjustment
costs: on the one hand, productive government expenditure enhances the productivity of
the existing capital stock, on the other hand, the government must balance its budget
which brings about a rise in the distortionary income tax rate.
Observe that a growth-maximizing expenditure share 
G 2 (0;1) may exist. It must be
strictly greater than in the world without adjustment costs since dc=dGjG= > 0. If
government expenditure is fully funded by a non-distortionary lump-sum tax the third
channel in (3.16) vanishes such that an increase in government spending unambiguously
raises the growth rate.
Pareto Eciency
The social planner internalizes (3.1) and the equilibrium condition K = Nk. He maximizes
utility (2.2) subject to the resource constraint (1   G)y = c + '(i;k;(G)) and i = _ k,
where y is given by (3.5). Following the steps that led to the implicit statement of the







+ [1 + (G)]P
c = (1   G)(A
GN)
1
1    : (3.17)
The latter generalizes (3.7) to the case with adjustment costs. Again the left-hand side
is strictly convex in P
c such that the constrained optimal growth rate is smaller under
adjustment costs.
If we allow the social planner to determine the size of G optimally, the welfare-maximizing
share of government expenditure, P
G, is greater than , thus exceeding its level without
adjustment costs. Intuitively, the possibility to reduce adjustment costs provides an ad-
ditional incentive for the government to expand its activity relative to the size of the
economy.
The comparison of the equilibrium to the constrained optimal growth rate reveals that
both rates are the same if the right-hand sides of (3.15) and (3.17) take on the same value.Productive Government Expenditure and Economic Growth { A Survey 10
From (3.8) we know that this is the case whenever (1 y)(1 ) = 1 G. Interestingly,
adjustment costs alter the implications of this condition for the optimal tax policy. For
instance, if government expenditure is fully nanced via lump-sum taxes (y = 0), then
the Pareto-ecient growth rate cannot be implemented since P
G > . The reason is
that a higher P
G does not only internalize the externality associated with the pure public
good but also reects the planner's incentive to reduce adjustment costs. Therefore, at
P
G the equilibrium incentives to invest are too pronounced relative to the ecient growth






=(1   ) > 0 is needed to
support the Pareto-ecient allocation.
3.3 Public Goods Subject to Congestion
Often, the services derived from the provision of a public good are subject to congestion.
Congestion eects arise if public goods are partially rival, i.e., their use as a produc-
tive input by one rm diminishes their usefulness to other rms. Examples include road
infrastructure or police and re protection.
Two forms of congestion can be distinguished, relative and aggregate (absolute) congestion.
In the former case, the level of services derived by an individual rm depends on its size
relative to the aggregate of rms. We refer to aggregate congestion if the level of services
received by the individual rm is decreasing in the aggregate usage. As noted by Eicher and
Turnovsky (2000), p.344, highway usage is an example of the former and police protection
an example of the latter:
\Unless an individual drives his car, he derives no service from a publicly
provided highway, and in general the services he derives depend upon his own
usage relative to that of others in the economy, as total usage contributes to
congestion. Police protection may serve as an example of absolute congestion:
in principle, people always enjoy this service, independent of their own actions,
though the amount of service they may actually derive varies inversely with
aggregate activity and the demands this places on the limited resources devoted
to this public service."
To study relative congestion, we use the ratio of individual to aggregate private capi-
tal, k=K, to measure the size of an individual rm relative to the economy. Then, the







where G 2 [0;1] parameterizes the degree of relative congestion associated with the
public good G. This specication includes the pure public good case (without congestion)Productive Government Expenditure and Economic Growth { A Survey 11
for G = 1. As G declines, congestion becomes more pronounced. Yet, as long as
G 2 (0;1), the government services derived by a rm of size k increases if G and K
grow at the same rate. Barro and Sala- -Martin (1992) analyze the case where G = 0.
Then, g increases only if G grows faster than K. The latter case is called proportional
congestion (Turnovsky (2000b), p. 618). As in equilibrium K = Nk, the public good is
then rival yet not excludable and the individual rm receives its proportionate share of
services g = G=N.
One specication the literature uses to capture aggregate congestion is g = GKG 1,
G 2 [0;1], i.e., government services are independent of rm size. With this specication,
the rms' production function ceases to exhibit constant returns to scale in private and
public capital. Therefore, steady-state growth can only arise under additional restrictive
conditions. To avoid these complications, we restrict attention to the case of relative
congestion with and without excludability.8 If a public good is excludable, then the
government can identify the user and charge an access fee.
3.3.1 Relative Congestion Without Excludability
Under relative congestion, we obtain the production function of the individual rm from











Individual rms believe that a rise in k increases their benet from the provision of public
services and disregard the impact of their investment decision on G and K. Applying




c = (1   y)(1   G)(ANG
G)
1
1    : (3.20)
Again, the rst term on the right-hand side is the after-tax marginal private return on
private capital. An increase in the degree of congestion, i.e., a decline in G, has two eects
on c: On the one hand, it augments the output elasticity of private capital, 1   G.
On the other hand, it weakens the scale eect through NG. Which eect dominates
depends on the number of household-producers and G.
8See, e.g., Glomm and Ravikumar (1994) for a discrete-time model with absolute congestion. Their
setup has a one period lag between the collection of taxes and the conversion of these revenues into public
services. Hence, methodologically this study belongs to the \stock case" to which we turn in Section 4. Ott
and Soretz (2007) argue that relative congestion of productive government activity may also be important
for the spatial distribution of economic activity.Productive Government Expenditure and Economic Growth { A Survey 12
As in the pure public good case, the growth-maximizing share of government expenditure

G for the benchmark scenario with full income tax nancing is equal to .
Pareto Eciency
The social planner is aware of the negative externality that the choice of k by an individual
rm exerts on the production technology of all other rms via the implied increase in the
aggregate capital stock K. He also knows that in a symmetric conguration no rm can
gain an advantage from the provision of public services by raising its capital stock. Since
all rms are identical, no rm can increase its size relative to other rms and/or the
economy.
In other words, the planner internalizes the equilibrium condition K = Nk in (3.18) which
then reduces to g = GNG 1. As a consequence, with (3.1) the relevant production func-
tion is y = (ANG 
G)
1=1  k and the constrained ecient growth rate of consumption
becomes
P
c = (1   G)(ANG 
G)
1
1    : (3.21)
The comparison of the equilibrium growth rate (3.20) to the constrained optimal growth
rate (3.21) gives
c = P
c , (1   y)(1   G ) = 1   G: (3.22)
With G < 1 the latter two equations generalize (3.7) and (3.8) to the case of congestion.
With congestion, the equilibrium growth rate may again be too high relative to the ecient
one. To see this, consider the case where G is chosen optimally, i.e. P
G = . Then, if
government expenditure is entirely nanced by lump-sum taxes, i.e., y = 0, it holds
that c > P
c . Intuitively, congestion drives a wedge between the private and the social
marginal return to private capital and induces an incentive to over-accumulate private
capital in the decentralized equilibrium. From (3.22) we derive the income tax rate for an










An income tax rate P
y eliminates this wedge and implements the Pareto-ecient alloca-
tion. Clearly, P
y increases the stronger the degree of congestion. In the extreme case of




3.3.2 Relative Congestion With Excludability
Some public services subject to congestion are excludable. This means that a potential
user of the service can be identied and charged a user fee. Examples include highways,
bridges, universities, or schools.Productive Government Expenditure and Economic Growth { A Survey 13
Ott and Turnovsky (2006) extend the previous setup and introduce a second public service
that is excludable. The modied production function of individual rms is
y = f(k;g;e) = Agek1  ; 0 < ; < 1; (3.24)
where e is the benet derived by the rm from the excludable public service. Just as the








here, E is the total amount of the excludable public service supplied by the government,
and E 2 [0;1] measures the degree of relative congestion. Using (3.25) and (3.18) in
















For the government, the key dierence between the provision of G and E is that the former
must be nanced through taxes whereas the latter can be nanced through a fee paid by
the individual user. Denote p this fee per unit of E. Then, the expression for the balanced
government budget (2.5) becomes G+E = yY +cC +N +pEN. Similar to condition
(3.1) for G, we assume that the provision of E is proportionate to the size of the economy,
i.e., E = E Y for all t.
Decentralized Equilibrium
For the individual household-producer, the new element is that besides c and k, she also
determines in each period her demand for the excludable public service. The associated
expenditure pEd must be added to the ow budget constraint (2.3) which modies to
_ k = (1   y)f (k;g;e)   (1 + c)c      pEd.
Since the choice of Ed does not aect utility directly, it is chosen to maximize the right-
hand side of the ow budget constraint. The associated optimality condition equates the
marginal after-tax product of the excludable input to its marginal cost, i.e.,
(1   y)
@y
@Ed = (1   y)
y
Ed = p: (3.27)
The latter delivers the demand of each household-producer, Ed(p). Since E is a public
good, in equilibrium we have E = Ed(p). Together with the proportionality constraint





Intuitively, the equilibrium user fee declines with the total number of users.Productive Government Expenditure and Economic Growth { A Survey 14
Applying the same reasoning that led to the Euler equation (3.20) delivers the equilibrium
growth rate







1     ; (3.29)
which generalizes (3.20) of the non-excludable public input case to  > 0. Since rms
neglect the congestive consequences of their own choice of the private capital input on
the aggregate economy, they continue to overestimate the before-tax marginal product of
capital.
Finally, consider the growth-maximizing government expenditure shares for the benchmark
scenario where the provision of G is fully nanced through income taxes, i.e, G = y.
With two public goods and a user fee given by (3.28) the two shares G and E are linked
by the government budget such that E =  (1   G). Using this condition, we obtain

G =  and 
E =  (1   ).
Pareto Eciency
The social planner internalizes congestion eects, i.e., he considers (3.26) in conjunc-








k and the resource constraint is _ k = (1   G   E)y   c.
The constrained ecient growth rate obtains as
P







1     ; (3.30)
the rst term on the right-hand side denoting the social marginal return on private capital.
If the social planner is allowed to choose G and E optimally, he picks P
G =  and
P
E = .9
The comparison of the equilibrium to the constrained optimal growth rate reveals that
c = P
c , (1   y)(1   G   E) = 1   G   E: (3.31)
The latter has interesting consequences for the budgeting of government services. To see
this, consider the case where P
G =  and P
E = . Then, (3.28) and (3.31) deliver the
following pair (P
y ;pP) that implements the ecient allocation
P
y =
(1   G) + (1   E)





1      
1   G   E

: (3.32)
9Again, this result can be linked to the natural condition of productive eciency. We obtain from
equation (3.26) with K = Nk and Y = Ny that dY=dG = (Y=G) = =
P
G = 1 and dY=dE =  (Y=E) =
=
P
E = 1. Hence, the marginal product of both government services provided out of current production
is one.Productive Government Expenditure and Economic Growth { A Survey 15
To satisfy the government's budget constraint at (P
y ;pP) a residual lump-sum tax or
subsidy may be necessary.
As a benchmark, consider the case where G = E = 1 such that both public services are
congestion-free. Then, P
y = 0 and pP = 1=N, i.e., there is no distortion of intertempo-
ral prices and each rm's demand for the excludable public service satises the natural
eciency condition @y=@Ed = pP = 1=N. In this case, the user fee fully nances the
provision of E. However, the provision of G must be nanced through some lump-sum
tax to guarantee a balanced budget.
In the presence of congestion, P
y > 0 is necessary to correct for the congestion externalities.
However, as P
y increases the price of the excludable service must fall since its after-tax
marginal product declines. Then, the provision of E requires cross-subsidization.
3.4 Public Consumption Services
Many publicly provided services matter for an economy because they directly enhance
the utility of households without aecting technology. Examples include cultural and
recreational public services such as museums, public parks, or public social events like
reworks. To study the role of such public consumption services, we extend the analysis
of the pure public good case of Section 3.1 and add a non-excludable service that enters
the utility function. This service is subject to absolute congestion. With these properties,
our analysis combines the framework of Barro (1990) and Turnovsky (1996c).10




e t (lnc + bh lnh) dt; (3.33)
where h is the service the individual household derives from the public consumption good,
and bh  0 measures the relative weight of this form of consumption. For simplicity, the
per-period utility is separable in c and h.
The public consumption good is subject to aggregate congestion in total output such that
the service, h, derived by each household falls short of the aggregate service, H, provided







10Cazzavillan (1996) studies the role of a public good that simultaneously aects per-period utility and
the production function of the representative household-producer. Under a more general utility function
that allows for increasing returns in the consumption externality of public expenditure, he shows that local
indeterminacy and endogenous stochastic uctuations may arise.Productive Government Expenditure and Economic Growth { A Survey 16
here, H 2 [0;1] measures the degree of aggregate congestion with H = 1 and H = 0
capturing the special cases of a pure public good and of proportional congestion, respec-
tively.
On the production side, we maintain the production function of equation (3.2). On the
government side, we need to add H as government expenditure such that a balanced
budget requires G + H = yY + cC + N. As in the previous sections, we tie the size of
H to the size of the economy: H = HY .
Decentralized Equilibrium
The individual household-producer behaves as in Section 3.1. Since H is non-excludable,
there is no optimization with respect to h. Moreover, when choosing k, she disregards the
link between k, aggregate output Y , and h that materializes under congestion.
As a result, the expression of the consumption growth rate in equilibrium is again given
by (3.4).11 However, if at least some part of H is funded via the distortionary income tax,
then, the level of c that satises the government's budget constraint is smaller. To see
this, consider the benchmark where G + H = yY . Then, y = G + H such that
c = (1   G   H)(1   )(AN
G)
1
1    : (3.35)
Since the government channels additional resources into non-productive uses, the latter
falls short of (3.4) with y = G. For the same reason, the growth-maximizing expenditure
share of the productive government services 
G = (1   H), declines in H. Further, in
this case the growth-maximizing share of public consumption services is zero.
Pareto Eciency
The omniscient planner considers the individual production function as in (3.5). The
resource constraint is _ k = (1   G   H)y   c. The key new element appears in the
per-period utility function. The planner knows that the congestion eect of equation
(3.34), the proportionality requirement, H = HY , and the aggregation Y = Ny imply
h = H (Ny)
H. Hence via (3.5), the choice of k directly aects per-period utility for
H > 0. The resulting constrained ecient steady-state growth rate is
P







The rst term on the right-hand side is the social marginal return on private capital. The
second term is the social rate of time preference. The provision of the non-productive
11This result hinges to some extent on the separability of c and h in the per-period utility function. If
the marginal utility of c depends on h, then the household's willingness to postpone consumption depends
on the growth rate of h. In a steady-state with congestion, the latter need not coincide with the steady-
state growth rate of all other per-capita magnitudes. We leave a more detailed study of the impact of the
interaction between c and h on the steady-state growth rate for future research.Productive Government Expenditure and Economic Growth { A Survey 17
public service reduces this rate. Intuitively, the presence of bh captures the fact that a
higher capital stock tomorrow raises the level of h, and hence tomorrow's utility. This
eect is stronger the smaller the congestion eect.12












The term in brackets on the left-hand side reects the possible deviation of the private
from the social marginal rate of return on private capital. The gap between these rates
depends on the way government nances its expenditure. A novelty compared to the pure
public good case of Section 3.1 is the deviation of the private and the social rate of time
preference that appears on the right-hand side.
We may expand the planner's choice set and allow him to determine the size of G and






























is unique in [0;1]2 such that equations (3.38) and (3.39)
intersect only once as depicted in Figure 1.
Intersection A corresponds to the case where bh = 0 and H 2 [0;1]. Then, there is no
utility associated with h. Hence, independently of the degree of congestion, the planner
chooses P
H = 0 and P
G =  and the optimal allocation coincides with the one of Section 3.1.
Case B has bh > 0 and H 2 (0;1). Here, P
H > 0 and 0 < P

















Since bh > 0, the planner is ready to provide public consumption services according to
the optimality condition @u=@H = @u=@c. As a consequence, the relative size of G falls.
To grasp the eect of congestion, recall that the planner is aware of the positive eect
of G on h in the utility function. This eect is more pronounced the lower the degree
of congestion. Hence, a rise in H increases P
G. In the limit H ! 1, H is a pure
public good and P
G !  as shown as intersection C in the Figure 1. In any case, the
welfare-maximizing share of public consumption services is positive. Hence, the provision
12In the special case of proportional congestion, where H = 0, the eect of k on h disappears because























of public consumption services may introduce a wedge between the goals of growth and
welfare maximization.13
The income tax rate that implements the Pareto-ecient allocation is found to be P
y =
(1   H)P
H. Hence, without the congestion externality, i.e., H = 1, no income tax is
needed to implement the Pareto-ecient allocation.
3.5 Endogenous Labor Supply
This section incorporates the labor-leisure decision, i.e., individual labor supply becomes
endogenous. In this context, a consumption tax as well as a tax on labor income are
distortionary since they aect the trade-o between consumption and leisure. Contrary to
the analysis of Section 3.4, public consumption expenditure turns out to have a positive
eect on the equilibrium growth rate. We develop an intuition for this result following the
presentation of Turnovsky (2000a).
The representative agent has a per-period time endowment equal to one and allocates the
fraction l 2 (0;1) to leisure and (1   l) to work. The per-period utility function takes the




[lnc + bh lnh + bl lnl] e t dt; bh;bl  0: (3.42)
13Park and Philippopoulos (2002) conrm this result in a setting that allows for a dierent set of second-
best optimal policies.Productive Government Expenditure and Economic Growth { A Survey 19
Since the focus is on the role of labor supply, we abstract from congestion eects associated
with the provision of public consumption services, i.e., H = 1 in (3.34) such that h = H.
On the production side, we incorporate labor as a productive input and generalize the
production function of (3.2) to
y = A[G(1   l)]
 k1 ; 0 <  < 1: (3.43)
Hence, there are constant returns to scale both with respect to private capital and la-
bor, and with respect to public and private capital. The former implies zero prots in a
competitive environment whereas the latter allows for steady-state growth of labor pro-
ductivity.
On the government side, we split the proportional income tax y into a tax on wage income
at rate w and a tax on capital income at rate r. With w and r denoting the real wage
and the real rate of return on private capital, the balanced government budget becomes
G + H = ww(1   l)N + rrK + cC + N.
Decentralized Equilibrium
Household-producers choose a plan (c;l;k) for each t such that (3.42) is maximized subject
to the budget constraint _ k = (1   w)w(1   l) + (1   r)rk   (1 + c)c   .
Following the steps that led to Euler equation (3.4) we obtain
c = (1   r)(1   )(AN
G)
1
1  (1   l)

1    : (3.44)
Observe that l appears as a determinant of c. Intuitively, since labor and capital are
complements in the production function (3.43), more leisure reduces the marginal rate of
return on private capital. Moreover, l is a choice variable that needs to be pinned down.
To nd a second condition that determines the level of leisure consistent with steady-
state growth, consider the product market equilibrium condition that coincides with the
economy's resource constraint _ k = (1   G   H)y   c. Expressing the latter in terms


















1  (1   l)

1 : (3.45)
A steady state needs c = k. If this requirement gives rise to a unique and strictly
positive steady-state growth rate, then there is a time-invariant level of steady-state leisure
depending on the policy variables G;H;r;w;c.
14The latter condition requires the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption to
equal the relative price of both goods, i.e., blc=l = w(1 w)=(1+c). Marginal cost pricing of labor gives
w = y=(1 l). Using both equations, we can determine the ratio c=y, which is then used to derive (3.45).Productive Government Expenditure and Economic Growth { A Survey 20
Turnovsky (2000a) shows that a rise in either public consumption services (H ") or in
public productive services (G ") nanced by a lump-sum tax increases the steady-state
growth rate. As to H, this is the result of two opposing forces. For a given labor sup-
ply, the growth rate declines since the government claims additional resources. However,
households increase their labor supply to make up for this negative income eect. Overall
the steady-state growth rate increases due to greater employment. These eects do not
materialize when labor supply is inelastic as in Section 3.4. In such a setting a lump-sum
nanced increase in H has no impact on steady-state growth.
The same two forces also operate in the case of an increase in G. In addition, there is a
third eect since a higher G raises the equilibrium wage and, hence, the labor supply. As
a result, the steady-state growth rate increases further such that @c=@G > @c=@H > 0.
If the lump-sum tax is accompanied by a consumption tax and/or a tax on wage income the
positive link between steady-state consumption growth rate c and i, i = G;H, weakens.
The reason is the distorted consumption-leisure decision, i.e., the household tries to avoid
the additional tax burden and substitutes leisure for labor. Hence, with endogenous labor
supply, a consumption tax ceases to be lump-sum and impinges on the economy's growth
rate.
Pareto Eciency
The social planner chooses a plan (c;l;k) for each t to maximize household utility sub-
ject to the economy's resource constraint. Compared to the optimization of competitive
households, the omniscient planner takes into account that the choice of l and k has an
eect on the level of government consumption services. Since H = HY appears in the
utility function this channel aects the constrained optimal steady-state growth rate of
consumption.












1  (1   l)

1    ; (3.46)
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(l)  (1=bl)(=(1 )(l=1 l). The presence of bh
(l) in the Euler equation (3.46)
captures the fact that, for a given level of leisure/labor, the presence of utility-enhancing
government consumption expenditure increases the benets from capital investment to-
day, lowering the consumption-output ratio and positively aecting the growth rate of
consumption.15 Further, the additional term bh
(l) in the numerator of (3.47) reects the
15The latter dominates the negative eect of leisure on the rate of return of private capital for any value
of l if bh=bl > 1. If 0 < bh=bl < 1, this only applies for not too small values of l.Productive Government Expenditure and Economic Growth { A Survey 21
fact that, from the planner's point of view, the marginal disutility of labor is lower since
more labor means a higher consumption of H. Via this channel, the consumption-output
ratio is lowered and the growth rate of capital is positively aected.
If we add the steady-state requirement P
c = P
k , then (3.46) and (3.47) give an expression
for the constrained optimal steady-state growth rate that is similar to (3.36) with H = 1
and a level of labor supply yet to be determined
P
c = (1   G   H)(AN
G)
1






In addition, (3.46) and (3.47) determine the steady-state labor supply implicitly.16
We can use our results to derive conditions under which a scal policy mix implements
the constrained ecient allocation. This requires
c = P
c , (1   r)(1   ) =

















According to the rst of these conditions, r has to be set such that the private marginal
after-tax return on private capital equals the social rate of return on private capital. The
second condition equalizes the consumption-output ratios of the equilibrium and planner's








Intuitively, the eect of a distortionary tax on capital income can be oset by a compen-
sating distortion of the consumption-leisure trade-o that strengthens labor supply. As
long as lump-sum taxation is a feasible option any policy mix satisfying (3.51) is consistent
with the government's budget constraint.17
If the social planner is allowed to pick G and H optimally, one nds that the optimal
choice involves
P
G =  and P
H = (1   )bh
(l); (3.52)
i.e., the optimal share of productive government expenditure satises the natural condition
of productive eciency, and the optimal share of consumption expenditure is tied to
the optimal level of leisure. Interestingly, from (3.49) and (3.50) the implementation of
(P
G;P
H) is only possible if r = 0 and w =  c.
16This condition is 
(l)(1+bh(1+z(l))) = z(l), where z(l)  
h









17Raurich (2003) studies optimal tax policies in the model of Turnovsky (2000a) assuming that neither
lump-sum nor consumption taxes are admissible, yet the government's budget must be balanced in all
periods.Productive Government Expenditure and Economic Growth { A Survey 22
3.6 Small Open Economy
Next, we turn to a small open economy with productive government expenditure, where
agents are free to accumulate internationally traded bonds in a perfect world capital
market. To highlight the role of openness we restrict attention to a pure public good
such that the production function of household-producers is given by (3.2). Moreover, we
abstract from the presence of public consumption services.
Since bonds and private capital are perfect substitutes as stores of value, in equilibrium
they must pay the same after-tax rate of return, which is tied to the exogenous world
interest rate  r. Hence, with government expenditure a xed fraction of aggregate output
according to (3.1) and an exogenous labor supply, this implies
(1   y)(1   )(A
GN)
1
1  =  r(1   b); (3.53)
where b is the tax rate on foreign bond income. Obviously, the pair of tax rates y
and b that satises this condition cannot be chosen independently. To circumvent this
problem, we introduce adjustment costs such that the price of installed capital, q, is
variable and adjusts in equilibrium such that these after-tax rates of return are the same
for any arbitrarily specied tax rates. The investment cost function is independent of








which simplies (3.9) by xing  = 1.
First, we study the case of an exogenous labor supply and then incorporate a labor-leisure
trade-o. We shall see that the implications for government activity substantially dier
in both cases. The exposition is based on Turnovsky (1999a).
3.6.1 Exogenous Labor Supply
Decentralized Equilibrium
Denote b the stock of net foreign bonds held by a household-producer at t and recall that
k is the stock of capital in her (domestic) rm. Then, her ow budget constraint is given
by
_ b =  r(1   b)b + (1   y)y   (1 + c)c   '(i;k)   : (3.55)
The government budget modies to G = yY + cC + rbbN + N.
The objective of household-producers is to choose a plan (c;i;b;k) that maximizes utility
(2.2) subject to (3.55) and _ k = i. From the individual's optimality conditions with respect
to c and b we obtain the Euler equation as
c =  r(1   b)   : (3.56)Productive Government Expenditure and Economic Growth { A Survey 23
Hence, in a small open economy, the consumption growth rate is independent of domestic
production conditions. It only depends on the given world interest rate, the tax rate on
foreigns bonds, and on the rate of time preference.
The optimality conditions with respect to k and i deliver




 r(1   b) =












As we saw in (3.12) the value of installed capital for an investing rm is greater than one.
Equation (3.58) is a non-linear dierential equation that describes the evolution of q such
that the after-tax rate of return on traded bonds is equal to the after-tax rate of return on
private domestic capital. The latter comprises the same elements as discussed following
equation (3.14). Observe that (3.58) collapses to (3.53) for q = 1.
Turning to the steady state, we know from (3.57) that private domestic capital grows at
the rate k = q   1, where q satises (3.58) for _ q = 0.18 Thus, the steady-state growth
rate of capital (and output) depends on the domestic production technology as well as on
various scal policy parameters. In contrast to the closed economy, consumption, capital
and output generically grow at dierent rates, with the dierence being reconciled by the
accumulation of traded bonds.





















The rst two derivatives describe the eect of a rise in government expenditure nanced
through an adjustment in lump-sum taxes. The steady-state growth rate of capital in-
creases since a higher G increases the marginal product of capital such that the steady-
state value of q in (3.58) increases; hence, k = q 1 rises. Due to (3.56), c is independent
of G. The second two derivatives consider the benchmark case where government activity
is only nanced by income taxation, i.e., G = y. This introduces an osetting eect on
the steady-state value of q since a necessary rise in taxes reduces the after-tax marginal
product of capital in (3.58). As in previous sections, there is a growth-maximizing share
of government expenditure equal to  at which the price of installed capital is maximized.







18 The presence of convex adjustment costs may prevent the existence of a balanced growth path; for
a discussion see Turnovsky (1996b). Further, the transversality condition of the household-producer's
problem requires  r (1   b) > k and implies that only the smaller root of (3.58) is consistent with steady-
state growth. Moreover, at this root, the right-hand side of (3.58) is negatively sloped.Productive Government Expenditure and Economic Growth { A Survey 24
Intuitively, an increase in the tax on bond income lowers the net rate of return on traded
bonds, which requires a lower rate of return on installed capital, hence a higher q ac-
cording to (3.58). Moreover, a higher b reduces the households' willingness to postpone
consumption and c declines.
Pareto Eciency
The planner maximizes u with respect to c;i;k, and b subject to _ k = i and the resource
constraint
_ b = (1   G)y +  rb   c   '(i;k): (3.61)
Accordingly, we obtain the constrained ecient steady-state growth rates of consumption
and capital as
P
c =  r    and P
k = qP   1; (3.62)









The interpretation of (3.62) and (3.63) mimics the one of (3.56) and (3.58) in the decen-
tralized equilibrium. Due to the presence of b, we have P
c > c. It follows that b = 0
is necessary to implement the constrained ecient allocation. Then, for the same reasons
set out in Footnote 18, we nd





Allowing the social planner to additionally determine the optimal size of the govern-
ment reveals that the growth-maximizing share of government expenditure is also welfare-
maximizing, i.e. P
G = . If G 6= , we obtain that capital and interest income should
be taxed at dierent rates. This result is driven by the assumption that government
expenditure is a xed fraction of output and thereby independent of interest income.
3.6.2 Endogenous Labor Supply
In this section we introduce an endogenous labor supply in the small open economy of the
previous section.
Decentralized Equilibrium
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subject to _ k = i, the budget constraint _ b = (1   w)w(1   l) + (1   r)rk +  r(1   b)b  
(1 + c)c   '(i;k)   , and the production function (3.43). This leads to the conditions
for consumption and domestic capital growth (3.56) and (3.57) as well as the following
optimality conditions
 r(1   b) =
(1   r)(1   )(AN
G)
1

























In the steady state _ q = 0 such that (3.66) determines the equilibrium price of installed
capital given l. Condition (3.67) implies that in a steady state with constant labor supply
c and y must grow at the same rate. Moreover, one can show that in a steady state y, k,
and G must grow at the same rate. It follows that
k = q   1 =  r(1   b)    = c: (3.68)
Equation (3.68) implies that, contrary to the case with exogenous labor supply, in equi-
librium capital, output, and consumption grow at the same rate determined by the net
interest rate on foreign bonds and the rate of time preference. Hence, with endogenous
labor supply the production side is irrelevant for the steady-state growth rates of con-
sumption and domestic capital.
From (3.68) it follows that out of the set of scal policy variables, only changes in b
generate steady-state growth eects. The reason is that (3.68) also pins down q. Therefore,
in a steady state changes in G, k, and b lead to adjustments of labor supply such that
(3.66) remains valid. One readily veries that dl=dG > 0, dl=dk < 0, and dl=db > 0.
Moreover, since w and c do not show up in (3.66) it follows that these taxes are essentially
lump-sum, i.e., dl=dw = dl=dc = 0. This is in stark contrast to the results obtained under
endogenous labor supply in the closed economy of Section 3.5.
Pareto Eciency
The social planner chooses a plan (c;l;i;b;k) to maximize individual utility (3.65) subject
to _ k = i and the resource constraint (3.61) where y is given by (3.43). Following the same
procedure as in the decentralized setting we obtain the steady-state conditions
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The tax rates that replicate the constrained ecient steady-state path, bring (3.66) - (3.68)
in line with (3.69) - (3.71). These are b = 0 and (1   r)(1 + c)=(1   w) = 1, where the
latter is a restatement of condition (3.51) derived for the closed economy. The welfare-
maximizing share of government expenditure is equal to . Moreover, with G = P
G, the
optimal tax rates can be shown to be r = 0 and w =  c. This conrms the results
of the small open economy with exogenous labor supply and for the closed economy with
endogenous labor supply. However, here the choice of P
G does not have a growth eect
but assures the static eciency of the steady state.
4 Productive Government Activity as a Stock
The dierence between the stock and the ow approach to modeling productive govern-
ment activity is that G(t) is not provided out of current output but results from past
public investments, i.e., G(t) is the aggregate stock of public capital at t.
The rst paper that treats productive government activity as a stock in our analytical
framework is Futagami, Morita, and Shibata (1993). These authors assume that the
public capital stock is a pure public good such that g = G. Here, we begin our discussion
of the stock approach by directly allowing for the congestion of public services. Then, we
incorporate two aspects that arise only if we think of productive government activity as a
stock.19
4.1 Public Goods Subject to Congestion
We follow Turnovsky (1997a) and assume that current public investment is a constant
fraction of aggregate output denoted by G 2 (0;1). We abstract from depreciation such
that G evolves according to
_ G = GY: (4.1)
The household-producer's production technology continues to be as in (2.1). As a con-
sequence, in the stock case G will only be a constant fraction of Y in the steady state,
whereas in the ow case this holds for all t in accordance with condition (3.1).
19The stock modeling approach has incorporated many facets that we will not discuss in detail. For
instance, Lau (1995) and Chen (2006) incorporate public consumption expenditure aecting the per-period
utility function. See Baier and Glomm (2001) and Raurich-Puigdevall (2000) for stock models with an
endogenous labor supply. Turnovsky (1997b) is the reference for a small open economy. This framework is
applied by Chatterjee, Sakoulis, and Turnovsky (2003) to analyze the process of developmental assistance
through unilateral capital transfers tied to investment in public capital. G omez (2004) devises a scal policy
that allows to implement the Pareto-ecient allocation when investments are irreversible. Devarajan, Xie,
and Zou (1998) study alternative ways how to provide public capital.Productive Government Expenditure and Economic Growth { A Survey 27
Let the service derived by the individual household-producer g be given by (3.18). As
in the ow model of Section 3.3.1, the individual household-producer chooses c and k to
maximize utility u of (2.2) subject to her ow budget constraint (2.3) and the production










In her intertemporal optimization the individual household-producer neglects her impact
on the aggregate private capital stock K and takes the stock of public capital G as given.
Then, the Euler condition obtains as












where we use the fact that in equilibrium K = Nk.
This growth rate looks similar to the Euler condition in the ow model (see, e.g., equation
(3.3) where G = 1). Again, the rst term on the right-hand side of the Euler equation
is the private marginal product of private capital. In the ow model, the ratio G=k is
determined by exogenous parameters since G is proportionate to Y at all t. Therefore,
the growth rate of consumption is time-invariant. Here, this is not the case since the
proportionality of G and Y occurs only in the steady state. As a consequence, additional
dierential equations are needed to fully characterize the dynamical system.
To derive these conditions, we divide the aggregate resource constraint (3.6) by k and the





























The dynamical system of the economy is then described by equations (4.2), (4.4), and
(4.5) in conjunction with initial conditions k0, G0, and the transversality condition of the
household-producer's optimization problem.
Here, we focus on the steady state and its properties. From (4.2) and (4.3), G, k, and
y have the same steady-state growth rate. This growth rate and the steady-state ratio,
(G=k)jss, can be obtained from (4.2) and (4.4). Figure 2 illustrates the loci c and G as































































































Figure 2: Steady-State Growth Rates: Decentralized Equilibrium (left) and the Imple-
mentation of the Pareto-Ecient allocation (right).
Next, we turn to the eect of scal policy variables on steady-state growth. A lump-sum
nanced increase in the share of government investment, G, corresponds to an upward
shift of the G-locus in Figure 2, which implies a higher steady-state growth rate. If instead
of a lump-sum tax a distortionary income tax is used for funding such that G = y, then
in addition the c-locus pivots downwards. The overall eect on the steady-state growth
rate depends on the relative strength of both shifts. Analytically, one can show that
dc
dG
R 0 ,  R G: (4.6)





In contrast to the individual household-producers the social planner not only chooses
c and k but also the public capital stock G to maximize utility (2.2) subject to the
aggregate resource constraint (3.6) and the accumulation equation of public capital (4.1)
with aggregate production y given by (4.3). This problem delivers the steady-state Euler
equation20
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The rst two terms on the right-hand side have an interpretation as the social return
of an additional marginal unit of output. Along the optimal path, the planner allocates
the fraction 1   G of this unit to private capital and the fraction G to public capital.
This partition is imposed by the public accumulation equation (4.1). The second term
20A detailed derivation of this and other results discussed in this section can be found in the Appendix.Productive Government Expenditure and Economic Growth { A Survey 29
corresponds to the benet of a marginal increase in the provision of public capital associ-
ated with G units of current output. Since the planner views G as a pure public good,
the marginal increase in aggregate output is N times the marginal increase in individual
output.
In light of (4.3) and (4.4), (4.7) can be written as
P





+ G   : (4.8)
In a steady state P
c = G such that (4.8) becomes
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The steady-state ratio (G=k)j
P
ss is then determined by the conditions (4.9) and (4.4). See
Figure 2 for an illustration.
Comparing c of (4.2) to P











Hence, an income tax rate y that implements (G=k)j
P
ss given G exists. It is lower the
lower the degree of congestion (i.e., the larger G) and higher the greater G.
Allowing the planner to choose G optimally delivers
P




1  < : (4.11)
Interestingly, P
G falls short of the growth-maximizing level 
G = . This dierence occurs
as the advantage of a larger public investment share materializes only tomorrow whereas
the cost in terms of foregone consumption is to be paid today. This intertemporal aspect
explains why P
G declines in . Since the benet of an increase in the stock of public
capital accrues to all rms, P
G increases in N. Notice, that no intertemporal consideration
is present when P
G is determined in the ow model of Section 3.3.1. Therefore, in that








1   G 
; (4.12)
implements the Pareto-ecient steady-state allocation involving P
G. The optimal income
tax corrects for the congestion externality and recommends the same tax rate as in theProductive Government Expenditure and Economic Growth { A Survey 30
ow model of Section 3.3.1 (see equation (3.23)). The larger the degree of congestion the
greater the optimal income tax.21
A curious implication arises when the degree of congestion is suciently high, i.e., G
close to zero. For instance, in the extreme case of proportional congestion, G = 0,
P
y =  > P
G such that the government should impose an income tax rate in excess of its
current investment costs and refund the excess revenue in form of lump-sum taxes. In the
respective ow model (equation (3.23)) the optimal income tax is P
y =  = P
G so that
government expenditure is exactly covered. Thus, in the stock model a larger income tax
rate is required in order to oset the incentive to overaccumulate private capital due to
congestion.
4.2 Maintenance of Public Capital
Due to its use or the passage of time, a fraction of the current stock of public capital
depreciates. Maintenance refers to investments that replace depreciated public capital.
Conceptually, the incorporation of such replacement investments requires the identica-
tion of wear and tear with dierent parts of the existing public capital stock. Since here this
stock comprises homogeneous capital goods, such an identication is not possible. There-
fore, we follow the literature, in particular Rioja (2003) and Kalaitzidakis and Kalyvitis
(2004), and model replacement investments as an attempt to reduce the instantaneous
rate of depreciation of public capital. The new question is then how the economy splits
up its expenditure on public capital into \new" public capital goods and in replacement
investments, i.e., investments that reduce the rate of depreciation.
Denote GI the per-period investments in \new" public capital goods and M the level of per-
period maintenance investments. Then, the economy's gross investment is GI +M. With
D denoting depreciation, the stock of public capital evolves according to _ G = GI +M  D.
As proposed by Kalaitzidakis and Kalyvitis (2004), we model the dierence between re-
placement investments and actual depreciation as





G; with G(:) > 0 > 0
G(:): (4.13)
The idea is that a higher level of maintenance M reduces the level of depreciation whereas
a more intense usage measured by Y increases it. With (4.13) the accumulation of public
21Marrero and Novales (2005) show that the presence of a signicant level of wasteful public expenditure
that does neither aect the economy's technology nor preferences is another reason for why a positive
income tax leads to faster long-run growth and higher welfare than lump-sum taxes. Turnovsky (1997b)
conrms the results of (4.11) and (4.12) for a small open economy with exogenous labor supply and private
and public investments subject to adjustment costs.Productive Government Expenditure and Economic Growth { A Survey 31
capital is governed by






We assume that the government nances its total expenditure, GI +M, via income taxes
such that the government's budget constraint is
M + GI = yY: (4.15)
Let M and (1 M) denote the shares of total government expenditure that are allocated
to maintenance and \new" capital goods, respectively, i.e.,
M = MyY and GI = (1   M)yY: (4.16)
To simplify, we abstract from congestion eects such that the individual household-








The individual household-producer chooses c and k to maximize her utility u given by
(2.2) subject to her ow budget constraint _ k = (1   y)y   c. The Euler condition is then






which corresponds to (4.2) for G = 1. The growth rates of public and private capital result
from the public accumulation equation (4.14) and the individual's resource constraint















Then, the dynamical system of the economy is given by (4.17)-(4.19) and initial conditions
k0, G0, and the transversality condition of the household-producer's optimization problem.
Analogously to the previous section, we obtain the steady-state ratio (G=k)jss and the
common steady-state growth rate for c, G, and k from (4.17) and (4.18). These equations
also reveal that no clear cut comparative statics for the steady-state growth rate with
respect to M and y are available. However, a steady-state growth-maximizing share of
maintenance investments, 
M, can be determined, at least implicitly. The total dierential
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Intuitively, the optimal allocation of current output to public capital investments satises
@ _ G=@GI = @ _ G=@M, i.e., the last marginal unit spent on maintenance contributes the
same amount to the change in public capital stock as the last marginal unit spent on
\new" public capital goods.
Kalaitzidakis and Kalyvitis (2004) show further that the growth-maximizing income tax
rate, 








This result contrasts with the nding of the previous sections where the growth-maximizing
tax rate was found to equal . Intuitively, the presence of maintenance adds a productive
use to public capital expenditure. To exploit this opportunity, the optimal income tax
should be higher than without it. To strengthen this intuition we introduce an explicit
functional form such that G = (My)
 ", " > 0. Then, 






In the limit " ! 0, the eect of maintenance vanishes and the optimal income tax is

y = . On the other hand, the eect of maintenance becomes more pronounced the
larger " and 
y ! 1 as " ! 1.22
Further, it can be shown that the growth-maximizing share of new public capital goods,
(GI=Y )
 = (1   
M)
y < . With G = (My)
 ", we nd using (4.22) in (4.21) that







Hence, for " = 0 we are back in the case without maintenance and (GI=Y )
 = . Moreover,
as " ! 1 all public expenditure goes to maintenance and (GI=Y )
 ! 0.
4.3 Stock-Flow Model of Public Goods
Thus far, we have considered either the ow or the stock approach to modeling public
services. An interesting question taken up by Tsoukis and Miller (2003) and Ghosh and
22Similar to the present setup, Greiner and Hanusch (1998) have a stock model where government
expenditure can be allocated to two uses. They are the accumulation of the public capital stock and
a subsidy to private capital accumulation. The point of their paper is that a rise in the subsidy rate
for private capital investment is not necessarily growth-enhancing because it diverts resources away from
productive government spending. Moreover, these authors show that for strictly positive subsidy rates the
growth-maximizing income tax rate is strictly greater than . Hence, the qualitative nding of (4.21) may
also be the consequence of a growth policy that strengthens the investment incentives of private 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Roy (2004) is whether and how new implications for growth and welfare arise if both
approaches appear simultaneously.
Let Gf denote the ow of public services and Gs the stock of public capital. Then, a








k1 ; 0 <  < 1: (4.24)
We assume that _ Gs = GsY and Gf = GfY . Moreover, total government expenditure
is fully nanced via a distortionary income tax and continues to be a xed fraction of
output, i.e.,
_ Gs + Gf = yY = GY; G  Gs + Gf: (4.25)
Tsoukis and Miller (2003) show that the growth-maximizing shares are

G = ; 
Gs = ; 
Gf = (1   ): (4.26)
Hence, each facet of public expenditure receives a share equal to its respective output
elasticity.
The Pareto-ecient allocation mimics the properties of the previous sections. In par-
ticular, one nds that the equilibrium shares of total expenditure and of public capital
investment are too large relative to their welfare-maximizing level whereas the equilibrium








Ghosh and Roy (2004) analyze the question how the government by deciding on the ratio
of the two types of public spending can at least partially compensate for the non-optimal
choices of the private sector.
5 Variations on a Theme
5.1 Stochastic Environments
Turnovsky (1999c) studies the role of productive government expenditure in a stochastic
version of the ow model with congestion as presented in Section 3.3.1. He nds that
under uncertainty the growth-maximizing level of government expenditure depends on
the degree of relative risk aversion. If the latter is strong, then the growth-maximizing
expenditure share exceeds the Pareto-ecient one.Productive Government Expenditure and Economic Growth { A Survey 34
On the production side, uncertainty is introduced via a productivity shock, du, that
is i.i.d.-normal with zero mean and variance 2
udt > 0. This shock is proportional
to the current mean ow of output. More precisely, the ow of output, dy, produced
by the individual household-producer over the small time period (t;t + dt) is dy =
Agk1 [dt + du], where g is given by (3.18). Government expenditure comprises a
deterministic, productivity-enhancing component, G, and a stochastic component, G0.
The total ow of resources claimed by the government over the period dt amounts to
d  G = Gdt + G0du. Both types of government expenditure are xed fractions of the ag-
gregate mean rate of the output ow, i.e. G = GNAgk1  and G0 = 
0
GNAgk1 .
Thus, the fraction G now represents the government's choice of the (deterministic) size
of government, while 
0
G represents the fraction of the aggregate output shock absorbed
by the government.




=(1   v), v  1. Here, v is the coecient of relative risk aversion.
This setting delivers a unique stochastic balanced growth path where the mean growth
rate depends on the degree of relative risk aversion, the variance of the shock, the shares
of government expenditure, and the degree of relative congestion. With 2
u = 0 and v = 1
this growth rate collapses to the one under certainty as given by (3.20). To interpret
the equilibrium under uncertainty we follow Turnovsky (1999c) and consider reasonable
degrees of relative risk aversion to be v > 1.
The mean steady-state growth rate increases in the variance of du. Intuitively, a higher
variance of the shocks means higher risk. Therefore, more risk-averse agents increase their
precautionary savings, which allows for faster growth.
The deterministic growth-maximizing share of government expenditure under full income
tax nancing, 
G, exceeds . The reason is that a higher G raises the productivity of
private capital and, since the shock is proportional to output, magnies the volatility of
output. As the latter induces more precautionary savings that increase the mean growth
rate there is an additional reason to increase G.
The introduction of uncertainty reduces the Pareto-ecient share of deterministic govern-
ment expenditure below 
G. Intuitively, the planner takes the individual's risk aversion
into account and chooses a smaller steady-state growth rate that comes along with lower
volatility. The optimal tax structure that implements the Pareto-ecient allocation has to
internalize the congestion externality. This is accomplished with a strictly positive income
tax. This tax reduces the growth rate of the economy and, hence, the degree of volatility.23
23Turnovsky (1999b) considers a small open economy under the same uncertainty as above. He shows
that the Pareto-ecient share of government expenditure is greater in the open than in the closed economyProductive Government Expenditure and Economic Growth { A Survey 35
5.2 Increasing Returns
Thus far, we have assumed that the production function of the individual rm exhibits
constant returns to scale with respect to private capital and productive government expen-
diture at the social level. Constant returns are, among others, responsible for the existence
of a balanced growth path and the absence of transitional dynamics in the ow models
based on Barro (1990). Intuitively, this assumption is not mandatory. For instance, in
developing countries the density of the road network may be so low that twice as much
private capital and twice as many roads more than double output.
Conceptually, in the presence of external eects associated with productive government
expenditure, the expected return on private capital investments of individual rms depends
on the investment decisions of all other rms. Thus, there is scope for a self-fullling
prophecy (Krugman (1991)). If all household-producers believe the return on investment
to be high, they will invest a lot today. Then, tomorrow aggregate output and, accordingly,
government expenditure will be large. The latter raises the return on investment such that
the belief of a high rate of return is conrmed in equilibrium.
Abe (1995) and Zhang (2000) incorporate increasing returns at the social level into the
ow setup and nd multiple equilibria and sophisticated transitional dynamics.24 For
instance, the dynamical system of Abe (1995) delivers a new locally-stable and stationary
steady state in addition to an endogenous growth path. Accordingly, the economy may be
trapped in a suciently small neighborhood of the stationary steady state. Alternatively,
a coordinated hike in investment activity may push the economy suciently far away
from this steady state such that it embarks on an endogenous growth path. The latter
may be either due to a self-fullling prophecy or to an unpredicted and temporary rise in
government activity.25
5.3 Non-Scale Growth
In previous sections, we have emphasized that the steady-state growth rate depends on
the size of the economy measured by the \number" of household-producers - at least as
if and only if the economy is a net creditor. The reason is that some of the risk of domestic productivity
shocks is exported and reduces the volatility of domestic income. Hence, for a given degree of risk aversion,
the individual is ready to accept a greater volatility caused by a bigger size of the government.
24Both authors generalize the production function (3.2) to y = AG
k
 where + > 1. Moreover, they
allow for the public good to aect per-period utility. Abe (1995) adopts the research production function
of Romer (1986), p.1019, to model capital accumulation.
25Some details necessary to guarantee the success of the suggested government intervention are quite
involved. Zhang (2000) reaches similar policy conclusions, e.g., when his interior stationary steady state
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long as the provision of the public good has an element of non-rivalry (see footnote 5).
The larger N, the faster the economy grows. This nding is often referred to as the scale
eect and has been criticized on both empirical and theoretical grounds (Jones (1995)).26
Here, it arises since the level of government expenditure is tied to the size of the economy
measured by aggregate output Ny.
Eicher and Turnovsky (2000) study productive government spending as a ow in a non-
scale endogenous growth model in the spirit of Jones (1995). As new elements, their
approach incorporates population growth, i.e., a constant growth rate of the \number"
of household-producers, N 6= 0, and a simultaneous treatment of relative and aggregate
congestion of public services.27 The latter is achieved with a modication of equation








where R;A 2 [0;1] parameterize the degree of relative and aggregate congestion, respec-
tively. Clearly, R = A = 1 is the special case of a pure public good.
In addition, Eicher and Turnovsky (2000) allow for increasing or decreasing returns to scale
in the production function of the individual rm such that (2.1) is replaced by y = Akg
with ; 2 [0;1]. Upon combining this production function, (5.1), and (3.1) one obtains









The latter is consistent with a balanced growth path involving c = k = y if
c =
(R + A   1)
1      A
N R 0: (5.3)
To x ideas, assume that the marginal product of capital in (5.2) is strictly positive, i.e.,
(A   1) +  > 0, and let N > 0. If the denominator of (5.3) is positive, then the
marginal product of capital is decreasing in (5.2). As a consequence, y cannot grow as fast
as k unless some of the growth of y is due to population growth. Indeed, the numerator
is only strictly positive if the output elasticity of labor is positive such that population
26The scale eect is a feature of the rst-generation endogenous growth models of Romer (1990), Gross-
man and Helpman (1991), and Aghion and Howitt (1992). Here, it results from the specication of the
production function for new knowledge. Subsequent idea-based growth models follow Jones (1995) and
modify this functional relationship to nd qualitatively similar steady-state growth rates as the one derived
in equation (5.3). See Jones (1999) for a concise summary of this literature and Eicher and Turnovsky
(1999) for a general treatment.
27Pintea and Turnovsky (2006) study the role of relative and aggregate congestion in a two-sector non-
scale model with private and \public" 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growth contributes positively to the growth of y. In turn, this is the case if the degrees of
congestion are not too pronounced.
The way we nd the steady-state growth rate of (5.3) is quite dierent from previous
sections. In fact, here we are not concerned with rst-order conditions to determine
intertemporal prices and, hence, the households' Euler condition. Instead, we require the
consistency of equal growth rates of per-capita magnitudes with the economy's technology
given by (5.2). As a result, the steady-state growth rate is independent of preference
parameters like  or scal policy variables such as G. Consequently, the derivation of a
growth-maximizing share of government expenditure 
G as discussed in Section 3 becomes
irrelevant.
By contrast, a welfare-maximizing share of government expenditure, P
G, can still be deter-
mined since the static allocation consistent with steady-state growth need not be ecient.
Eicher and Turnovsky (2000) show that P
G = . Moreover, there is a time-invariant in-
come tax rate that implements the Pareto-ecient allocation P
y = (2   R   A)=( +
(1 R)). Intuitively, P
y internalizes both externalities caused by relative and aggregate
congestion. Clearly, P
y decreases in R and A.
6 Concluding Remarks
What is the role of productive government expenditure for sustained economic growth?
The literature surveyed in this paper provides a rich set of hints to a full-edged answer.
First, it establishes an analytical framework in which productive government activity is
necessary for balanced growth of per-capita magnitudes. Without government activity, we
would be back in the neoclassical growth model without technical change and sustained
long-run growth. In this framework, government activity can be treated either as a ow
or as a stock. In both cases the technology of the economy has the following properties.
At the level of individual rms, there are constant returns to scale with respect to private
capital, k, and the services derived from productive government activity, g. At the social
level, two assumptions imply that the production function of the individual rm becomes,
at least asymptotically, linear in k. First, services, g, derived by individual rms are
proportional to the level of total government activity, G. Second, the current ow of
government expenditure is proportional to the size of the economy. In the ow case, since
G = GY the linearity in k holds at all t; in the stock case, since _ G = GY , this linearity
holds only in the steady state.
As a consequence, the steady-state properties of the scenarios under scrutiny are similar
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rate. We use this property to study and compare the link between productive government
activity, economic growth, and welfare in dierent economic settings.
Second, productive government expenditure impacts on the steady-state growth rate of
consumption through a direct eect on the technology and an indirect eect on investment
incentives through the mode of nancing. The direct eect is strictly positive except for
the small open economy where consumption growth is determined by parameters that are
exogenous to the domestic economy. This can be veried from the rst column of Table I.
It shows the eect of a larger government share, G, on consumption growth under full
lump-sum nancing. Another polar case has full income tax nancing. Such a tax reduces
the after-tax marginal return on private capital. Hence, the indirect eect on consumption
growth is strictly negative. Column 2 in Table I reveals that these opposing forces tend to
give rise to a growth-maximizing government share. In most settings, this share is equal to
the output elasticity of the public input, . If the government service in addition reduces
adjustment costs, then 
G > ; if the government also provides consumption services, then

G < .
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Third, the welfare-maximizing, i.e., Pareto-ecient, share of government expenditure -
Column 3 of Table I - need not coincide with the growth-maximizing government share.
This reects the trade-o involved in the consumption-savings decision that the plannerProductive Government Expenditure and Economic Growth { A Survey 39
takes into account: faster growth requires higher investment outlays and reduces con-
sumption today. Most interestingly, here the dierence between the ow and the stock
variant matters. In the stock case, the benet from government expenditure today is
smaller since it augments output only tomorrow. Therefore, the welfare-maximizing share
of government expenditure is smaller.
Fourth, as shown in Column 4 of Table I, appropriate scal policy measures can implement
the Pareto-ecient allocation. Intuitively, a strictly positive income tax can be used
to correct for overaccumulation of private capital due to a negative externality such as
congestion.
Arguably, within this well-dened analytical framework further facets of the link between
productive government expenditure and sustained economic growth can be studied. One
important aspect for economic growth is the government's ability and willingness to en-
force \the rule of law." On the one hand, we can think of private corruption that a strong
government may want to combat. This introduces an alternative form to use collected
resources in a productive way. An interesting question is then what the optimal degree
of corruption depends on if a given amount of tax revenues must be allocated towards
competing productive tasks. This goes beyond Mauro (1996) who introduces corruption
as a proportional tax on income in the setup of Barro (1990) and nds no distortion in
the composition of public spending. On the other hand, the government itself may be
weak and corrupt, hence, an impediment to economic growth.28 One way to incorporate
the consequences of inecient government behavior is to assume that the government
cannot transform collected tax revenues one-to-one into, say, productive public infras-
tructure. Finally, an interesting and related question concerns the determinants of the
share of productive government expenditure. While in the models discussed above G was
either exogenous or chosen optimally by a planner, in reality this parameter reects fun-
damental characteristics of the process of collective decision-making and the distribution
of preferences and endowments (see, e.g., Alesina and Rodrik (1994)).
How about the role of productive government expenditure for sustained economic growth
once we leave the well-dened analytical framework based on Barro (1990)? Arguably, one
weakness of this approach is the knife-edge assumption of constant returns to scale (see,
e.g., Solow (1994) for a critique of such assumptions). We have seen in Section 5.2 that
increasing returns substantially alter the predictions of the growth performance. While the
presence of increasing returns is empirically not implausible the policy recommendations of
these models are hard to formulate since there is no natural way to select among multiple
equilibria. Clearly, more research is needed here.
28See Acemoglu (2005) for a dierent notion of weak and strong states and their implications for economic
development.Productive Government Expenditure and Economic Growth { A Survey 40
Some authors argue forcefully against the framework of Barro (1990) because neither the
prediction of scale eects nor the dependency of the steady-state growth rate on taxation
nds empirical support (see, e.g., Peretto (2003)). Indeed, the steady-state growth rate
generated by non-scale models tends to be independent of government activity and the size
of the economy. However, as we have seen in Section 5.3, the steady-state growth rate in
the model of Eicher and Turnovsky (2000) is entirely determined by the technology of the
economy and its consistency with a balanced-growth path. The role of economic agents is
then quite passive. Moreover, in cross-country growth regressions the partial correlation
between population growth and the growth rate of per-capita GDP is often found to be
negative (see, e.g., Barro and Sala- -Martin (2004) or Kormendi and Meguire (1985)).
In any case, it seems fair to say that the main body of the existing literature on produc-
tive government expenditure and economic growth is rooted in the tradition of investment-
based endogenous growth models. In view of the strength and weaknesses of this approach
it will be desirable in future research to incorporate productive government expenditure
into idea-based endogenous growth models. This allows to address new questions, e.g.
related to the eect of government activity on the productivity of an economy's research
technology. On the other hand, these studies will generate ndings that should be com-
pared to those presented in this paper in order to select robust policy implications.Productive Government Expenditure and Economic Growth { A Survey 41
7 Appendix: The Pareto-Ecient Allocation of Section 4.1
Derivation of Equation (4.7)









































where   = denotes the endogenously determined shadow value of public capital in terms of private
capital.
Then, (7.1) to (7.3) deliver the planner's consumption growth rate, 
P
c , and a dierential equation describ-
ing the evolution 
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As the steady-state equilibrium of this economy is one in which consumption, private and public capital all
grow at the same rate, it is convenient to express equations (7.4)-(7.7) in terms of the stationary variables
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The steady-state condition _ z = _ x = _ q = 0 delivers





x   (1   G)AN
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; (7.12)
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)z   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 1 [(1   G) + NG] = 0: (7.13)
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such that (7.15) corresponds to equation (4.7) of Section 4.1 with y given by (4.3).
Derivation of 
P
G of Equation (4.11)













Hence, for an unconstrained Pareto-optimum _  = 0 is required. From (7.14) it follows that z
P = N=(1 
), and thus _ z = 0. Then, from (7.9) and the transversality condition we know that also x must be constant

























Resubstituting (7.17) into (7.12) we obtain
x













Moreover, solving (7.16) for G delivers

P






which corresponds to (4.11) in the main text.
Derivation of 
P
y of Equation (4.12)











Then, comparing c of (4.2) to 
P
c of (7.19) reveals that
c = 
P
c , (1   y)(1   G ) = (1   ):





1   G 
;
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